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India-Pakistan Relations: Legalization
and Agreement Design
Sandeep Gopalan*

ABSTRACT

This Article examines agreements between India and
Pakistan to determine if there are design features that played a
part in their success or failure. The analysis draws on insights
from scholarship at the intersection of international relations
theory and internationallaw. The Article attempts to show that
India and Pakistan share attributes that are particularly well
suited for a positive correlation between increased legalization
and compliance, that the law plays a role in norm
strengthening, and that legalizing agreements between the two
states can create compliance constituencies that act as
constraininginfluences on governments.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article examines India-Pakistan relations from a theoretical
perspective, in an attempt to determine whether there is a correlation
between the commitments embodied in agreements between them,
their successful implementation, and the form and structure of those
agreements. The Author draws on recent scholarship at the
intersection of international relations theory and international law on
the design and structuring of agreements to explore pathways to
increasing the role of the law in positively impacting the relationship
between the two states. Despite the fact that India and Pakistan are
nuclear-weapons states with a history of engaging in military
confrontations, the international law community has not focused
much attention on the design and structure of agreements between
them to determine whether there is a correlation between the choice
of design, structure, and compliance. International lawyers have
been peripheral to the discussion, and there is inadequate attention
to the positive contribution that the law can play in finding solutions
to the differences between the parties. This Article hypothesizes that
these two states share attributes that are particularly suited for a
positive correlation between increased legalization and compliance,
that legalization plays a role in norm strengthening, and that
legalizing agreements between the two states can create compliance
constituencies that act as constraining influences on governments.
A review of agreements struck by states shows that they employ
a variety of structures to arrive at accord, ranging from official
communiqu6s to treaties. While these agreements exhibit some
commonalities in their underlying substance and structure, there is
lack of clarity on what motivates states to choose between a
communiqu6 and a treaty, with the result that predictions on what
form an agreement might take are fraught with risk. Even after a
particular form has been chosen, there is imprecision in terms of
differentiating attributes between the various forms. In terms of
language, many communiqu6s contain language that might be readily
transposed onto a treaty and vice versa.
All of this is rather
confusing and makes the task of reform difficult. There have been
recent scholarly analyses of agreement design in the multilateral
context, but these provide incomplete explanations when applied to
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dyads like India-Pakistan.1 Agreement design scholarship has also
largely been institutionalist and has not provided much clarity on
what sorts of agreements have the potential from their inception to
succeed when the signatories are states with a history of armed
conflict.
The Kashmir dispute is one of the bloodiest in contemporary
history. 2 The terrible price that India and Pakistan continue to pay
for a territory with little economic significance has not brought the
parties to the negotiating table in any meaningful way. 3 This is owed
to the visceral nature of the dispute as well as the sharp communal
and religious divides that characterize Indian and Pakistani
societies. 4 The fragility of peace between the countries and the
fluctuation of rhetoric depending on the regime in power have meant
that most observers have very little hope for a harmonious
relationship, 5 which is perhaps one reason for the absence of
significant attention by legal scholars to the analysis of the
agreements that have been concluded thus far. This hopelessness
seems to have become self-fulfilling. 6 There are signs of activity,
mainly at the prompting of the US, and the time may be ripe for

1.
See, e.g., Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard Law and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421 (2000); Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner,
International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA J. INT'L L. 113 (2003);
Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of InternationalAgreements, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 579
(2005); Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 499 (1999);
Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in InternationalAgreements, 99 AM J. INT'L L. 581
(2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 503 (1995).
2.
See generally Orde Kittrie, More Process than Peace: Legitimacy,
Compliance and the Oslo Accords, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1661 (2003).
3.
NAzIR KAMAL & AMIT GUPTA, PROSPECTS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL
IN SOUTH ASIA 9 (1998), available at http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/cmc-papers/sand9805055.pdf.
4.
This seems to be a quality that is shared by some of the other
"intranational" conflicts that are currently festering. Although, strictly speaking, the
Kashmir dispute is international in the sense that it is between two different nation
states, a closer look reveals that it is an "intranational" dispute. See generally MONTY
G. MARSHALL & TED ROBERT GURR, PEACE AND CONFLICT 2003: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF
ARMED

CONFLICTS,

SELF

DETERMINATION

MOVEMENTS

AND DEMOCRACY

(2003),

available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/peace-and-conflict.asp (characterizing the
dispute).
5.
See generally Sumathi Subbiah, Security Council Mediation and the
Kashmir Dispute: Reflections on its Failuresand Possibilitiesfor Renewal, 27 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 173 (2004).
6.
Kittrie, supra note 2, at 1662, suggests that this lack of examination is not
unique to the case of India and Pakistan. According to Kittrie, there has been an
absence of sufficient examination and analysis by legal scholars even of more high
profile conflicts, such as the one between Israel and Palestine. See id. He writes that
"the legal literature contains virtually no discussion of what in the contents of a
bilateral peace agreement's text can maximize the likelihood that the parties will
comply with the peace agreement's terms." Id.
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examining the process of agreement design to maximize the potential
for favorable outcomes.
Part II of this Article will examine the relevant theoretical
approaches that can be brought to bear in understanding the design
and structuring of agreements between India and Pakistan. Part III
will provide a historical background to the dispute and will analyze
the resulting peace process and agreements, with a view to
identifying the degree of legalization and the efficacy of the various
agreements that the parties have concluded. Part IV presents an
evaluation of the peace process, employing the lenses of the
theoretical approaches examined in Part II, and demonstrates that
legalization has a positive correlation with compliance in the case of
these two high conflict states, with probable applications to other
high conflict situations. This Article argues that legalization, apart
from the obvious informational, precision, and enforcement
advantages, helps solidify the norms cascades that are taking place,
and creates and empowers compliance constituencies (developing
support for the liberal theory posited by Moravcsik, et al. that places
non-state actors at the center of international law). The Article also
argues that in the case of politically tumultuous dyads, the
dissonance in political choices between competing political actors can
only be mediated by hard legalization that has the ability to bind
successor governments.

II. THEORETICAL APPROACHES
Public international law scholars tend to argue that in
structuring international agreements, states are motivated by the
objective to enhance the credibility and enforceability of their
agreements. 7 These scholars analogize states to private contracting
parties and seek to argue that all else being equal, states will act in
the manner of private individuals and structure their agreements as
contracts.8 They will do this because they are motivated by the need
to make their promises binding, and in order to do that, they must
comply with the obligations undertaken. 9 This compliance, in turn, is
ensured by providing mechanisms that measure adherence and
deviation. The conventional view argues that, unlike private parties
in the contractual context, states are not required to pay damages for
breaches of contractually assumed obligations but may have to suffer
reputational sanctions (although private parties are susceptible to

7.
8.

Guzman, supra note 1, at 581.
Id.

9.

Id.
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reputational sanctions in addition too). 10 In contract law, when there
is breach, the court or other tribunal attempts to craft a remedy that
bears some correlation between the nonbreaching party's loss and the
breaching party's gain. In international law, the nonbreaching state
suffers a loss that is not compensated for by the breaching state's loss
of reputation, if any.
Despite this problem, the concept of
"compliance" has influenced scholars examining agreement design in
the area of public international law. 11 Thus, they have focused
extensively on monitoring mechanisms and the existence of sanctions
and sanction-awarding bodies. Scholars also assume that the
dominant players are rational states-acting to maximize contractual
surplus. 12 Accordingly, in structuring international agreements,
states are most concerned about the "impact" that the agreement will
have in changing state conduct. It is this concern about impact that
will animate states in choosing between "hard" and "soft" law. If
states desire to have low impact they are more likely to choose soft
law; conversely, high impact will result in a hard law choice.
Abbott and Snidal, the most important functionalist scholars,
argue that states choose soft law as a "way station" to hard law, and
that it is the preferred option when the subject is one that challenges
state sovereignty.' 3 They also argue that legalization is a means to
increase the credibility of their commitments and that states are
motivated by factors such as domestic political costs, the desire to
bind successive governments, and the need to motivate citizens to
modify their practices when they choose hard law as a means of
assuring credibility. 14 According to Abbot and Snidal, credibility is
enhanced by the ability of legalization to limit "self-serving autointerpretation."' 15 This is extended when one considers the whole
international system, in which the consequences of bad conduct
within a particular regime can extend to other aspects of the
international law system. I6 They argue that auto-interpretation is
limited by arbitral tribunals interpreting and applying hard legal
commitments.' 7 Abbott and Snidal seem to be expressly limiting the
ability of tribunals to apply and interpret hard law. They hypothesize

10.

See generally George

W. Downs

& Michael

A. Jones,

Reputation,

Compliance, and InternationalLaw, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (2002).

11.
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International
Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002).
12.

ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN

THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 27 (1984); see also Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern
International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J.
INT'L L. 335 (1989).

13.
14.
15.
16.

Abbott & Snidal, supranote 1, at 423.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 427.
Id.

17.

Id.
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that hard law would result where: "the benefits of cooperation are
great but the potential for opportunism and its costs are high,"
noncompliance is not easy to detect, states want to form clubs of very
committed states, and executive agencies within a state want to
commit other domestic actors such as the legislature.18 They argue
that hard law is more costly because states are more careful in
"negotiating and drafting legal agreements, since the costs of
violation are higher."1 9
The argument that domestic political pressures have a role to
play in the choice between pledges and contracts is not new. 20 This is
certainly true in areas that are hotly contested in the political space.
Liberal theorists also argue that credibility is factored into the choice
of soft law versus hard law. 21 Otherwise, when credibility is
dependant on legislative approval, states are more likely to prefer
hard law, unless those states possess other mechanisms to ensure
and enhance credibility. 22 Raustiala claims that there is a prevalence
of shallowness in hard law and that there is a negative correlation
between legality and depth. 2 3 He argues that pledges are deeper
than contracts because they do not raise compliance worries. 24
Hence, states are likely to prefer pledges if they want to make deep
commitments rather than shallow ones. Conversely, states will prefer
hard law when they are making shallow commitments; for this
reason, hard law is likely to exhibit higher levels of compliance.
Raustiala then advances the other, seemingly contradictory,
functionalist argument that there is a positive correlation between
legality and depth-meaning that states embody their agreements in
hard law when they are making deep commitments.2 5 He writes that
both explanations are possible and can be understood by addressing
the risk of compliance-there is a negative correlation when a state
may not want to comply, and there is a positive correlation when a
state wants other states to comply. 26
He proffers a liberal
explanation for these correlations, arguing that the correlation
between legality and depth will be positive when the domestic
constituencies that are pushing for the agreement have political
power (which explains hard law in deep commitments such as the

18.
Id. at 429-30.
19.
Id. at 434. Abbott and Snidal write that "[llegal specialists must be
consulted; bureaucratic reviews are often lengthy. Different legal traditions across
states complicate the exercise. Approval and ratification processes, typically involving
legislative authorization, are more complex than for purely political agreements." Id.
20.
Raustiala, supra note 1, at 598.
21.
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1, at 426.
22.
Raustiala, supra note 1, at 600.
23.
Id. at 601.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. at 602.
26.
Id.
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WTO) and will be negative when the domestic constituencies
27
demanding agreement do not possess much political power.
A. FunctionalistPerspective
Functionalist theorists argue that states should adopt
legalization when the issue is one of commitment or coordination,
with the objective of benefiting from cooperative action. 28 According to
this view, there is a cost benefit analysis that states engage in when
deciding whether to legalize, with the choice depending on
legalization's ability to deliver outcomes that are more beneficial than
non-legalization. 29 Some of these benefits include the ability of
legalization to supply credibility to commitments, lower ex post
transaction costs, and supply monitoring mechanisms. Abbott and
others posit that harder legalization makes state commitments more
credible by creating precise agreements that contain obligations of a
higher order. 30 They argue that transaction costs ex ante are higher
with hard legalization because of the difficulty of negotiation and
obtaining concord on these sorts of agreements. 31 It is likely that as
the levels of obligation and precision increase, it will be more difficult
for states to bind themselves because of the fear of breaching these
32
obligations and the minimization of wiggle room to make excuses.
This initial increased cost may be offset by lower costs after an
agreement has been reached because the existence of precise
obligations makes enforcement easier and because many hard
legalized agreements create tribunals for interpretation and
enforcement. 33 Monitoring costs are thus reduced and may justify the
expenditure of upfront resources. Abbott and Snidal also point to
sovereignty costs (by which they mean incursions on state sovereignty
in the subject area) as being a factor that can militate against hard
3 4
legalization.
The relative power relationship between states is also a factor in
determining the extent to which legalization occurs. 35 More powerful

27.
Id.
28.
Miles Kahler, The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 INT'L. ORG.
661, 673 (2000).
29.
Id. at 664.
30.
Abbott & Snidal, supranote 1, at 429.
31.
Id. at 434.
32.
Id. at 436.
33.
Id. at 435.
34.
Id. at 435. See also Kahler, supra note 28, at 665 ("They hypothesize that a
combination of high uncertainty and low sovereignty costs will lead to institutions with
lower precision coupled with higher obligation and moderate delegation. High
sovereignty costs and low levels of uncertainty are likely to produce greater precision
and obligation with less delegation.").
35.
Id.
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states have little or no incentive to legalize when dealing with less
powerful states, as they may be able to obtain outcomes that they
want without resort to legalization. Kahler argues that the power
asymmetry argument is "heavily qualified" by the fact that the
strongest advocates for legalization are the United States and
Europe, both major players in the legalization game despite being
more powerful than other parties to the various international legal
instruments. 36 Abbott and Snidal suggest that there is a preference
for softer forms of legalization when powerful states are involved,
upon the understanding that there will be long term advantages in
the form of lowered transaction costs. 37 Kahler suggests that
asymmetries may extend beyond those involving mere power-there
may be asymmetries in terms of legal skills-that explain the
unwillingness of some states, particularly developing ones, to legalize
38
agreements.
B. Realist and Rational Choice Perspectives
Realists believe that international law only has effect to the
extent that it is the product of a relationship of dominance between
nations and is a reflection of this power dynamic.3 9 Broadly speaking,
the realist perspective denies that international law has any
constraining power and claims that if any such power does exist, it is
extremely weak. 40 The international legal system is effective only to
the extent that the dominant states are willing to shoulder the
burdens of being the policemen. Realism is state-centric, focusing on
state preferences that are assumed to be, largely, fixed. Rational
choice theory has recently been at the forefront of scholarly discussion
due to an influential book by Posner and Goldsmith, which argues
that "international law emerges from states' pursuit of self-interested
policies on the international stage." 41 The conduct of India and
Pakistan presents a curious situation for Posner and Goldsmith's
thesis, for the two states seem to be in a position where rational selfinterest would dictate that they resolve their differences using the
law to "clarify[] what counts as cooperation or coordination," unless

36.
Id. at 666.
37.
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1, at 450.
Kahler, supra note 28, at 666 (noting that one exception is the example of
38.
"small European states [which] are strong proponents of legalization, not only because
they wish to constrain the behavior of their more powerful neighbors, but also because
they possess legal resources out of proportion to their other capabilities").
39.
See generally Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA.
J. INT'L L. 545 (2004).
40.
41.

See generally id.
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

13 (2005). "International law is, in this sense, endogenous to state interests. It is not a
check on state self-interest; it is a product of state self-interest." Id.
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one takes the position that these two states are acting irrationally. 42
A fuller examination of rational choice using India-Pakistan
interactions as a proxy for demonstrating irrationality in high conflict
scenarios is the subject of another article and is not addressed here.
C. Liberal Perspective
The chief contribution of the liberal view is the centrality that it
confers on non-state actors and the relationship between domestic
politics and international law. 43 These non-state actors (whom
Moravcsik calls "societal actors") "are on the average rational and
risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to
promote differentiated interests under constraints . . . . ,,44 It is
premised on a "bottom-up" approach, whereby the preferences of nonstate actors "are treated as exogenous causes of the interests
underlying state behavior. '4 5 States are liable to be captured by one
or another interest group and act to express those preferences, which
are now the state's preferences in international politics. 46 Under this
framework, the main battleground for international legalization is
the domestic political arena, and "international legal norms are most
effectively enforced when they are embedded in autonomous domestic
'rule of law' legal systems through legal incorporation, judicial
acceptance, or acceptance by lawyers and litigants." 47
This
perspective can make important contributions to understanding the
formation of preferences in the India-Pakistan context, because of the
diversity of non-state actor political preferences and their possible
mediation through legal institutions. Given the possible differences
in India's preferences depending on whether it is the Bharatiya
Janata Party that is in power rather than the Janata Dal, and the
potential implications that such different preferences can have for
peaceful relations, it is important to determine what role, if any, a
greater use of the law can play in minimizing radical adverse shifts in
4
preferences. 8

42.

Id.

43.

Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal International Relations Theory, A Scientific

Assessment, in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: APPRAISING THE

FIELD (Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman eds., 2002). See also Andrew
Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A liberal Theory of InternationalPolitics, 51
INT'L ORG. 513 (1997).

44.
45.
46.
47.

Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 43, at 516.
Id.
Id. at 518.
Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54

INT'L ORG. 385, 393 (2000).

48.
A similar dichotomy in preferences in Pakistan would be between the
Jamaat-I-islami and the Pakistan Peoples Party.
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D. Consequences of Legalizing Agreements
Is there a correlation between legalization and compliance with
international agreements? Realist scholars deny any such correlation
unless the legalization is the product of a power dynamic whereby a
powerful state uses legalization on a less powerful state.
Functionalist scholars such as Abbott, on the other hand, believe that
there is a correlation between legalization and norms. They believe
that legalization comes with the promise of greater cooperative and
distributive gains. 49 Abbott and Snidal suggest that legalization
confers benefits such as enhanced credibility and lower transaction
costs, with the caveat that these benefits may be outweighed by other
costs that are inherent in legalization such as negotiation costs and
sovereignty costs.5 0 The relationship between legalization and liberal
theory will be in evidence in Part IV of this Article, where it is argued
that legalization offers superior advantages over non-legalized
agreements because of its ability to engage societal actors that have
been marginalized in the India-Pakistan context.

III. THE DISPUTE
A. Birth of the Nations and Dispute
Pakistan and India attained independence on August 14 and 15,
1947, respectively. 5 1 Statehood on communal lines following British
colonialism was the result of an acrimonious process of partitioning
pre-independent India into Muslim Pakistan and predominantly
Hindu India. 52 This redrawing of the maps saw one of the biggest
human relocations in history, as people uprooted and moved from
villages and towns that they had called home for generations.5 3 The

49.
Kahler, supra note 28, at 673. Kahler recognizes that "studies that
demonstrate high levels of compliance with agreements may well suffer from a
selection bias: following functionalist logic, governments will only negotiate
agreements and establish institutional rules that they fully intended to follow in any
case. An apparently high level of compliance could result from the fact that
legalization has not altered government behaviour in the slightest." Id.
50.
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1, at 448, 455.
51.
IndependenceDay.com, http://www.123independenceday.com (last visited
Apr. 12, 2007).
52.
The partition followed the Independence Act, which permitted the leaders
of the 565 semi-independent princely states owned by the British to choose either
independence (not a viable option) or accession to either India or Pakistan.
53.
Several accounts put the number of displaced people at over twelve million.
See, e.g., URVASHI BUTALIA, THE OTHER SIDE OF SILENCE: VOICES FROM THE PARTITION

OF INDIA 87 (Duke Univ. Press 2000) (1998).
The departure of barbers, weavers, tailors, goldsmiths, and others en masse to
Pakistan crippled certain aspects of life particularly in Delhi. In Pakistan, the
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religious hatred predating independence was to linger for over fifty
years. 54 The state of Kashmir, which had not acceded to India or
Pakistan as of August 15, 1947, was to be the pretext. 55 Both India
and Pakistan undertook strenuous efforts to get Kashmir to join
them, and the situation was complicated by the fact that the King of
Kashmir was a Hindu while the majority of his subjects were
Muslims. 56 The King (as any rational actor would) seemed to prefer
independence, as he did not want to be part of an Islamic country by
joining Pakistan or to cede power by joining secular India.
Ultimately, on October 17, 1947, the King, faced with news of a
Pakistan army orchestrated infiltration and seeing that he had very
little choice, signed the Instrument of Accession, and Kashmir
became a part of India. 57 Article 1 of the Instrument of Accession
clearly states: "I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of
India .... ,,58 The Schedule, which enumerates legislative powers,
states that the Dominion legislature (i.e., India) shall have the power

departure of account clerks, bankers, lawyers and teachers dealt a similar
blow .... As a new country, Pakistan had no instant arrangements to print its
currency: the mint was in India .... So, for about a year, Pakistani currency
were printed in India, as was much governmental material and
stationary ....
Pakistani officers (for currency) were trained in India for
several weeks and India loaned accountants to Pakistan to help out with
accounting work.
54.
Jeffrey Weiss, India and Pakistan-A Cautionary Tale for Israel and
Palestine, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 455, 460 (2003).
55.
See Karen Heymann, Earned Sovereignty For Kashmir: The Legal
Methodology to Avoiding a Nuclear Holocaust, 19 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 153, 158 (2003).
56.
Anthony Wanis-St. John, The Mediating Role in the Kashmir Dispute
Between India and Pakistan, 21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 173 (1997). See generally
Brian Farrell, The Role of InternationalLaw in the Kashmir Conflict, 21 Penn. St. Int'l.
L. Rev. 293 (2003); Heymann, supra note 55.
57.
Wanis-St. John, supra note 56, at 175. "As a condition for receiving Indian
military reinforcements to repel an invasion of Pashtun tribal raiders, Hari
Singh signed a letter of accession to India on October 26, 1947." Id. This instrument
was worked out under the provisions of the Government of India Act 1935, an Act of
the British Parliament, which served as the Indian Constitution at the time by virtue
of the Indian Independence Act 1947. Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir
State, Oct. 26, 1947, available at http://mha.nic.in/accdoc.htm [hereinafter Instrument
of Accession]. The relevant provision providing for accessions stated: "An Indian State
may accede to the Dominion of India by an Instrument of Accession executed by the
Ruler thereof .. " Id. Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir executed the Instrument of
Accession, and the Governor General accepted the Instrument. Id. This act was
acknowledged by the United States in the United Nations Security Council in 1948 by
U.S. representative Warren Austin. See Embassy of India, A Comprehensive Note on
Jammu & Kashmir: The
United Nations, http://www.indianembassy.orgl
policy/Kashmir/Kashmir MEA/UN.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (quoting the
statement by Austin that "[tihe external sovereignty of Kashmir is no longer under the
control of the Maharaja . . .with the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, this
foreign sovereignty went over to India and is exercised by India").
58.
Instrument of Accession, supra note 57, at art. 1. The agreement shows
that a set of sovereign powers was retained by the Maharajah.
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to make laws with regard to military and defense matters. 59 In
addition, India has the power to make law with regard to external
relations. 60 Pakistan vigorously contested this accession, and war
broke out between the two countries just a few months after
independence in 1948.61 The festering conflict over this act of
accession has resulted in three wars and several skirmishes. 62
Kashmir has become the central feature of the relationship between
the two countries, and movement on other contested issues is very
63
difficult without first addressing it.
B. Agreements Between the Parties
This Part examines the fruits of the peace negotiations that have
occurred over the years and tries to understand whether there are
structural or design reasons that may have contributed to their
success or failure. There have been several agreements of significance
since independence. The first of these is the 1960 Indus River Water
Treaty. 64 This agreement was necessitated by the geographical
complexities caused by partition of the Indus Basin, which left
Pakistani Punjab dependant on irrigation facilities that were located
in India. 6 5 This resulted in a fierce dispute, and negotiations were
conducted under the aegis of the World Bank. 66 The Treaty was
signed at Karachi by President Muhammad Ayub Khan, the
President of Pakistan, and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the
Prime Minister of India. 67 Crucially, one of the signatories of the
Treaty was a representative of the World Bank.6 8 The Treaty devised
an elaborate method of sharing the waters of the Indus and
essentially allocated the water from the eastern rivers to India and
the water from the western rivers to Pakistan. 69 It also allowed India

59.
Id. at sched., art. A.
60.
Id. at sched., art. B.
61.
Id.
62.
Wanis-St. John, supra note 56, at 174.
63.
Kashmir seems to be the "core" issue for Pakistan in a way that it is not for
India. Pakistani politicians have repeatedly stated that other issues cannot be
addressed without solving the Kashmir dispute, whereas the Indian approach has been
to de-link Kashmir from other issues on which it believes that progress is possible. See
generally KAMAL & GUPTA, supra note 3. The authors cite a public survey in Pakistan
showing that almost 80% of the Pakistani respondents would not accept the status quo
in Kashmir, illustrating that the Kashmir issue is a part of the public consciousness in
that country in a way that it is not in India. See generally id.
64.

See HENRY

L. STIMSON

CTR.,

The Indus

Waters Treaty: A

History,

http://www.stimson.org/print.cfm?SN=sa20020116301 (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
65.
See id.
66.
See id.
67.
See Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., Sept. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 126
[hereinafter Indus Waters Treaty].
68.
See id.
69.
See id.
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to utilize water from the western rivers for some agricultural uses
and stipulated the storage capacities of the various reservoirs. 70
Article VIII of the Treaty created the Permanent Indus Commission,
and each country established an Office of the Commissioner for Indus
Waters.7 1 The Permanent Indus Commission is comprised of these
two commissioners, who are charged with the task of operationalizing
the Treaty and facilitating cooperation. 72 Each Commissioner is the
representative of his or her government for all matters arising out of
the Treaty, and the two are required to meet periodically. 73
Amazingly, over eighty-six such meetings have taken place between
the two sides. 74 The Commissioners have the opportunity to tour the
rivers every five years. 75 The Treaty also requires them to host ad
hoc tours of sites promptly upon request by the Commissioner from
76
the other country.
Apart from serving a monitoring function, these provisions serve
as informational safeguards and go a long way in defusing tensions
that stem largely from suspicion. By creating provisions that seek to
enhance transparency, the Treaty limits prisoner's dilemma problems
and serves to increase the likelihood of cooperative outcomes. Kraska
writes that the agreement establishes constituencies by:
broadening the numbers and types of participants throughout the
basin, including governments and non-governmental organizations. The
negotiations tend to include an array of scientific, technical,
environmental, ecological, legal, administrative, economic, and military
interests. The involvement of all of these interests has a progressive
effect, helping to build an integrated approach to civil government and
77
foreign relations.

The Indus Treaty is high on obligation, high on precision, 78 and high
on delegation. Under the Abbott-Snidal model, this is an example of

70.
See id.
71.
Id. at art. VII.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Indus
Waters
Treaty,
available at
http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXTO,,contentMDK:20320047-page
PK: 146736-piPK:583444-theSitePK:223547,00.html.
75.
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 67, at art. VIII.
76.
Id.
77.
James Kraska, Sustainable Development is Security: The Role of
Transboundary River Agreements as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) in South
Asia, 28 YALE. J. INT'L. L. 465, 469 (2003).

78.
One example of the precision includes Article VI of the Indus Waters
Treaty, supra note 67, which makes extensive use of a detailed verification regime,
under which both states are required to regularly exchange "daily [ ] gauge and
discharge data relating to the flow of the [r]ivers," daily reservoir extractions or
releases, and daily withdrawals and escapages from all canals. These data may be
requested by the other party as frequently as on a daily basis, if available. See id.
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hard legalization. 79 The Treaty has continued to survive despite wars
that were fought between the two countries and has served its
purpose. One author writes that:
[t]here was intense pressure from hardliners in India for New Delhi to
abrogate the Indus Waters Treaty, which would be seen by Pakistan as
a threat to cut off water at some point in the future. Many in India
went even further, arguing not only that the meeting should be
skipped, but that India should abrogate the treaty altogether. Instead,
India conducted the commission meetings because it wanted to "show
80
the world that it is behaving responsibly."

The second significant agreement between India and Pakistan is
the Rann of Kutch Agreement, which the two nations signed in 1965,
after military action over a territorial dispute pertaining to an area
called the Rann of Kutch threatened to escalate. 81 Under British
coaxing, the two countries agreed to a cease-fire and to submit the
dispute to arbitration.8 2 The terms of the Agreement provided that
the parties would undertake "to implement the findings of the
Tribunal in full as quickly as possible," and that the Tribunal should
remain intact until its findings had been implemented. 83 The
Agreement allowed each party to nominate a non-national as a
member of the Tribunal, with its chairman to be appointed by the
Secretary General of the United Nations. After the Tribunal rendered
its award, the parties jointly demarcated the boundary, and the
Tribunal was dissolved on September 22, 1969.84 The process was a
model for cooperation and took only four years.8 5 Copeland writes
that "[n]either side questioned the authority of the Tribunal, . . . and
both sides worked together to implement the decision," and that one
of the reasons for the success of the arbitration was that the issues
were well defined.8 6 This Agreement, under the Abbott-Snidal model,
would be an example of hard legalization with a high level of

79.
See generally Abbott & Snidal, supranote 1.
80.
Kraska, supra note 77, at 494.
81.
India and Pakistan both claimed the Rann as part of their territory. J.
Gillis Wetter, The Rann of Kutch Arbitration,65 AM. J. INT'L L. 346, 346 (1971).
82.
Id. See also Mukund G. Untawale, The Kutch-Sind Dispute: A Case Study
in InternationalArbitration,23 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 818 (1974).

83.
Wetter, supra note 81, at 348.
84.
Rann of Kutch Arbitration (India v. Pak.) (The Indo-Pak. Western
Boundary Case Trib. 1968), excerpts reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 633, 667 (1968).
85.
Carla S. Copeland, The Use OfArbitration To Settle TerritorialDisputes, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 3073, 3080 (1999).

86.

Id.

[1] mportant to the success of the arbitration was that the dispute over the Rann
did not represent a major political dispute between the two countries. The
Rann had little economic or strategic value and was sparsely populated. Thus,
although large-scale fighting preceded the arbitration proceedings, the dispute
was more symbolic than substantive.
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obligation, high level of precision, and high level of delegation.8 7 It is
perhaps no coincidence that this is one of the most successful
Agreements between the two nations. It is also significant that the
Agreement was signed on the Pakistani side by a military leader
rather than a politician,8 8 which supports arguments pertaining to
correlation between regime and legalization and the need to enlist the
key compliance community-here, the Pakistani army.
The two countries signed the Tashkent Declaration in the
immediate aftermath of the second war between them, in 1965.89
Under the brokerage of the Soviet Union, Indian Prime Minister Lal
Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Muhammad Ayub Khan
met for the Tashkent Conference from January 4th through 10th, 90
with the Soviet Premier Kosygin playing the role of a mediator and
facilitating the signing of the document. 9 1 Under the Declaration, the
two countries agreed to "exert all efforts to create good neighborly
relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United
Nations Charter" and affirmed "their obligation . . . not to have
recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful
means." 92 Both sides agreed to withdraw their troops to positions
held prior to the commencement of the hostilities, and in a
foreshadowing of the Shimla Agreement, agreed to follow "the
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs" 93 and "discourage
any propaganda directed against the other country. '94 The language
of the Declaration was mainly general and vague, containing such
promises as to "consider measures towards the restoration of
economic and trade relations, communications, as well as cultural
exchanges between India and Pakistan, and to take measures to
implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan." 95
One of the few provisions containing action pertained to the
repatriation of prisoners of war.
This Declaration is medium to high on obligation (committing
the parties to renounce violent methods to solve disputes), low on
precision (as it does not provide much content for the obligations and

87.
See generally Abbott & Sinidal, supra note 1.
88.
Rajat Ganguly, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute, Asian Studies
Institute
and
Center
for
Strategic
Studies,
available
at
http://www.vuw. ac.nz/asianstudies/publications/workingKashmir.html.
89.
The Tashkent Declaration [1966], STORY OF PAK., June 1, 2003,
http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A139.
90.
Id.
91.
See id.
92.
Tashkent Declaration, India-Pak., art. I, Jan. 10, 1966, available at
http://www.indianembassy.org/South-Asia/Pakistan/Tashkent-Declaration-January-1
0_1966.html.
93.
Id. at art. III.
94.
Id. at art. IV.
95.
Id. at art. VI.
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does not spell out the consequences of violation), and low to
nonexistent on delegation. Under the Abbott-Snidal Model, it is an
example of low legalization. 96 It is hard to understand the reasons for
the contrast between the Tashkent Declaration and the Rann of
Kutch Agreement given that they occurred proximately in time to
each other. The former is characterized by soft legalization (or no
legalization), whereas the latter is an example of successful hard
legalization. One can only speculate whether this is because the
parties did not intend that their obligations be binding or because
they did not appreciate the effect of legalization on ensuring
compliance.
The fourth accord of significance is the oft-quoted Shimla
Agreement of July 2, 1972. 97 It was signed by Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi of India and President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan in the
immediate aftermath of the war between the two nations that
resulted in the creation of the new nation of Bangladesh. 98 The first
paragraph of the Agreement states,
The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved
that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that
have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a
friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable
peace in the subcontinent so that both countries may henceforth devote
their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the
99
welfare of their peoples.

In order to give effect to this exhortative statement of intent, the two
parties committed to applying "the principles and purposes of the
Charter of the United Nations" in their relations. 100 They also
declared that they would "settle their differences by peaceful means
through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means" and
that both would "prevent the organization, assistance or
encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peace
and harmonious relations."' 01
Under the Agreement, the two countries recognized that "the
prerequisite for reconciliation, good neighborliness and durable peace
between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful
coexistence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and
sovereignty, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, on
the basis of equality and mutual benefit."'1 2 They also agreed to

96.
See generally Abbott & Sinidal, supranote 1.
97.
Shimla Agreement, India-Pak., July 2, 1972, 858 U.N.T.S. 71, availableat
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Kashmir/shimla.htm
[hereinafter
Shimla
Agreement].
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at para. 1.
100.
Id. at para. 2(i).
101.
Id. at para. 2(ii).
102.

Id. at para. 2(iii).
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''refrain from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of each other."'10 3 Recognizing the state of
hysteria that existed on both sides of the border, the governments
committed to taking "all steps within their power to prevent hostile
propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will
encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote
'10 4
This is a key
the development of friendly relations between them.
and
one-sided
hysterical
of
backdrop
a
amidst
comes
it
clause because
country
each
when
a
time
at
and
countries
media coverage in both
had a tendency to demonize the other. Political speeches were often
replete with demogogic language that was calculated to inflame
passions and incite hatred. The clause, at least in theory, sought to
co-opt key constituencies into the peace process by committing them
to toning down the rhetoric. With regard to immediate normalization
of relations following the war, the Agreement committed both sides to
"resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land including
border posts, and air links including over flights," "promote travel
facilities," "[resume] trade and cooperation in economic and other
agreed fields," and "[promote] exchanges in the fields of science and
10 5
culture.'
With regard to de-escalating tensions along the border, both
sides agreed to withdraw troops and maintain the cease-fire line as
the border.' 0 6 Both sides also committed to periodic meetings to

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at para. 2(vi).
Id. at para. 3.
Id. at para. 4.
See id. at para. 6(ii).

In Jammu and Kashmir, the [L]ine of [Clontrol resulting from the ceasefire of
December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the
Neither side shall seek to alter it
recognized position of either side.
unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both
sides further undertake to refrain from threat or the use of force in violation of
this [Lline.
This is an important part of the agreement, and the Line of Control (LOC) has grown
over time into something approximating a permanent border. The dividing line
between the two regions is the LOC. See Michael Fathers, Play Nice, TIME ASIA, Feb. 5,
2001, at 18, available at http://www.time.comltime/asia/magazine/20010205/
kashmir.html (noting that the Shimla Agreement established the LOC as the informal
border between India and Pakistan); see also Shimla Agreement, supra note 97, at para.
("[T]he line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be
6(ii)
); Charles Sanctuary, Analysis: Contentious Line of
...
respected by both sides.
Control, BBC NEWS, Jan. 4, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/southasia/
377916.stm (confirming that the LOC basically matches the frontline at the end of the
1947 war). The LOC became the flash point for many cross-border incursions and a
constant build-up of troops. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, KASHMIR: CONFRONTATION AND
MISCALCULATION 9 (2002) (describing the nuclear use policies of India and Pakistan in
the Indo-Pak conflict), excerpt available at http://www.crisisgroup.orghome/index.cfm?
l=1&id=1864.
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ensure that the peace process continued. 107 The Shimla Accord
continues to have rhetorical value to this day, and even
pronouncements by militant Islamic groups based in Pakistan bear
this out.1 0 8
An examination of the Shimla Accord using the legalization lens
reveals that it is medium to high on obligation; it commits the states
to peace by "prevent[ing] the organization, assistance or
encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peace
and harmonious relations." 10 9 It is relatively low on precision because
it does not stipulate in detail how these objectives are to be achieved
or the consequences of a violation of the obligations assumed. It is
also low to non-existent on delegation, as the Accord is silent on
implementing
agencies,
enforcement,
monitoring,
and
interpretation. 110 Under the Abbott and Snidal Model, the Shimla
accord is an example of low legalization.1 11 This may signal the fact
that the parties did not intend to undertake serious obligations and
saw the Accord only as a stopgap measure. This could certainly be
true in the case of Pakistan, as it had suffered enormously in the
1971 war, losing east Pakistan entirely and suffering the ignominy of
Indian forces deep into its western territory. 112 Pakistan had clear
incentives to avoid hard legalization as it would be negotiating from
an inferior bargaining position and would not want to undertake
obligations that it would find hard to get out of. Given the
shrewdness of Pakistani President Zulfikar Bhutto, this conclusion is
inescapable.
It remains something of a mystery as to why India gave up the
enormous bargaining advantage that it possessed by virtue of victory
in the 1971 war to push for a legally binding agreement that was
structured as an exemplar of hard legalization. Given the precarious
nature of democracy in Pakistan, India should have had every reason
to reduce the agreement to hard legalization in order to have the
assurance that the Pakistani army would consider it binding. If the
obligations enshrined in the Shimla Accord had been supported by
high levels of precision and delegation, the chances of its success
would have been significantly enhanced. In contrast to the Rann of
Kutch Agreement, which was an example of hard legalization, the

107.
Shimla Agreement, supra note 97, at para. 8.
108.
See, e.g., Shimla Accord Still Relevant: Jamiat Chief, REDIFF INDIA ABROAD,
July 17, 2003, http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jul/17pak.htm (quoting the statement
by the Chief of the Pakistani religious organization Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Maulana
Fazal-ur Rehman: "Kashmir is a big issue but both the countries have the Shimla
Agreement as a guiding principle to solve their disputes bilaterally").
109.
Shimla Agreement, supra note 97, at para. 2(ii).
110.
See id.
111.
See generally Abbott & Sinidal, supra note 1.
112.
See generally The 1971 India-Pakistan
War Site, http://www.
subcontinent.com/1971war/1971war.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
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Shimla Accord is regarded as a failure insofar as it has failed to
resolve the differences between the parties-although it is no small
fact that there has been no full-scale war since its adoption. 113 The
Accord may also be a limited success because it established
bilateralism as the dominant approach to solving disputes between
the states.
In 1988, India and Pakistan entered into an agreement to
prohibit the attacking of each other's nuclear installations. 114
According to the agreement, "Each party shall refrain from
undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly,
any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any
nuclear installation or facility in the other country." 115 For the
purposes of the agreement, it appears that no distinction was made
between civilian and military nuclear facilities. The operative term
states that "nuclear installation or facility" includes "nuclear power
and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes
separation and reprocessing facilities as well as any other
installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in
any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radioactive materials. ' 116 The agreement requires each nation to notify
the other about the precise locations of the respective nuclear
facilities. 117 The agreement is high on obligation, reasonably high on
precision, and low on delegation. It appears to be couched in the
language of hard legalization, and compliance is difficult to measure
in the absence of a full-blown war following the agreement.
In 1992, India and Pakistan entered into an agreement that
provided for "the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. '118 The
agreement included a commitment to abjure from developing,

113.
One author argues that the Agreement is actually a stumbling block:
"Because of its strict requirement of bilateralism, the Agreement has been viewed as a
roadblock preventing any real progress." Farrell, supra note 56, at 315.
114.
The preamble of the Agreement declares that "[t]he Government of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Government of the Republic of India, hereinafter
referred to as the Contracting Parties, reaffirming their commitment to durable peace
and the development of friendly and harmonious bilateral relations; conscious of the
role of confidence building measures in promoting such bilateral relations based on
mutual trust and goodwill." Agreement Between India & Pakistan on Prohibition of
Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities pmbl., Dec. 31, 1988, available at
http://www.indianembassy.org/South-Asia/Pakistan/ProhibitionAttackNuclear-Dec_
31_1988.html.
115.
Id. at art. 1(i). It was signed by Humayun Khan, Foreign Secretary of
Pakistan, and K.P.S. Menon, Foreign Secretary of India. Id.
116.
Id. at art. 1(ii).
117.
Id. at art. 2 ("Each Contracting Party shall inform the other on 1st January
of each calendar year of the latitude and longitude of its nuclear installations and
facilities and whenever there is any change.").
118.
Agreement on Chemical Weapons, India-Pak., 1992, excerpt available at
http://www.thenti.comle_research/official-docs/inventory/pdfs/indpakch.pdf.
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possessing, or using chemical weapons, as well as to refrain from
assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to engage in the
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, or use of chemical
weapons. 119 At the time of the signing of the agreement, both parties
declared that they did not possess stockpiles of chemical weapons.
This agreement is high on obligation, high on precision, and high on
delegation.
Whether it was seriously intended or not, in 1997 Pakistan put
forth a proposal for a non-aggression treaty. 120 While the treaty
suggested limitations on nuclear weapons and missile development, it
is unlikely that there was much substance to these proposals since
both countries continued their missile and nuclear weapons programs
with, if anything, even greater vigor. The landscape on the Indian
side was dramatically altered by the victory of the pro-Hindu
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in March 1998.121 Those who expected
the BJP's ascent to power to translate into a worsening of relations
with Pakistan were in for a surprise, as the peace process made
significant progress under the BJP's rule.
The BJP had historically assailed the Congress Party for
following a policy of "minority appeasement," being soft on Muslim
fundamentalism, and failing to put Pakistan in its place. In an
attempt to signal its intention to be tough, almost immediately after
taking office in 1998, the government conducted four nuclear tests. 122
There was predictable condemnation from the international
community, and the fear of an arms race escalated. 123 Pakistan felt
compelled to respond, and shortly thereafter, conducted its own tests.
Sanctions were imposed on both countries and, faced with the specter
of a nuclear war in one of the most populous regions of the world, the
international community turned its attention to promoting dialogue
124
between the two countries.

119.
Id.
120.
See Press Release, Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Prompting Nuclear-Weapon
Technology Race, India Tells Disarmament Committee, U.N. Doc. GA/DIS/3084 (Oct.
17, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1997/19971017.GADS3084.
html.
121.
See Surya Prakash, The 1998 Election Marks a Watershed, PIONEER, Apr.
13, 1998, availableat http://www.hvk.org/articles/O498/0082.html.
122.
For an archive of related stories, see Global Beat, South Asian Nuclear
Crisis http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/india.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2007)
123.
Ashok Sharma, India conducts nuclear tests, angering rival Pakistan and
world, STAR-LEDGER, May 12, 1998 ("Japan, Australia and New Zealand condemned
India's tests. All three said they had recalled or planned to recall their ambassadors the strongest diplomatic protest short of cutting off relations. Some officials in Japan,
India's largest donor, called for a suspension of aid.").
124.
Steve Chapman, Nuclear security blanket, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1998. See
Uttara Choudhury, Seven years after going nuclear, India and Pakistan thriving,
Agence FRANCE-PRESSE, June 2, 2005 (writing that sanctions imposed by the United
States on India included "a selective ban on bilateral and multilateral loans and a
blacklist of 40 Indian and Pakistani agencies and their 200 subsidiaries that U.S. firms

20071

INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

In February 1999, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and
Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee resolved to negotiate,
and in a highly symbolic move, Mr. Vajpayee traveled to Lahore by
bus. The two sides issued a joint communique, known as the "Lahore
Declaration."'1 25 This is the most important agreement between the
two sides in recent history. Under the Declaration, each side
shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of
Jammu and Kashmir; shall refrain from intervention and interference
in each other's internal affairs; shall intensify their composite and
integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the
agreed bilateral agenda; shall take immediate steps for reducing the
risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss
concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for
confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at
prevention of conflict; reaffirm their commitment to the goals and
objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realisation
of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view to
promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their
quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress and
cultural development; reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all
its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this

were banned from dealing with" and that they were estimated to have an impact of
$1.14 billion by the Indians); Japan lifts sanctions on India, Pakistan, PTI NEWS
AGENCY (New Delhi, India), Oct. 26, 2001 (noting "Japan is lifting the sanctions on
India in the hope of easing tension in the region and to seek New Delhi's political
involvement in Afghanistan after the ruling Taleban falls from power"). See also
Government torn on lifting Pakistan sanctions, DAILY YOMIURI AND THE YOMIURI
SHIMBUN (Tokyo, Japan), Oct. 19, 2001.
Lahore Declaration, India-Pak., Feb. 21, 1999, available at http://www.
125.
usip.org/library/pa/ip/ip-lahore19990221.html [hereinafter Lahore Declaration]. The
preamble to the Lahore Declaration states that:
The Prime Ministers of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, [s]haring a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and
of progress and prosperity for their peoples; Convinced that durable peace and
development of harmonious relations and friendly cooperation will serve the
vital interests of the peoples of the two countries, enabling them to devote their
energies for a better future; Recognising that the nuclear dimension of the
security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for
avoidance of conflict between the two countries; Committed to the principles
and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the universally
accepted principles of peaceful co- existence; Reiterating the determination of
both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit;
Committed to the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation; Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence
building measures for improving the security environment; Recalling their
agreement of 23rd September, 1998, that an environment of peace and security
is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all
outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this
purpose ....
Id. at pmbl.
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menace; shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental
126
freedoms.

Clearly, the Lahore Declaration contains some lofty objectives, but
the language is worded in such generalities that it is impossible to
on
enforce. Under the Abbott-Snidal Model, it would be high 127
obligation, low on precision, and low to non-existent on delegation.
Although the Declaration frequently uses the word "shall," the
absence of any content and precision coupled with the complete
absence of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms militates against
it being a binding agreement. This lack of authorativeness was
destined to be the agreement's downfall; just a few months after
entering into the Declaration, Pakistani-backed insurgents, under the
charge of the military establishment (without apparent political
backing) launched a campaign in Indian-Kashmir that required
Indian military action to evict them. When matters seemed to be
escalating with the possibility of Indian reprisals beyond Kargil,128
President Clinton pressured the Pakistani Prime Minister to
withdraw the insurgents. 129 However, the military establishment
appeared to be beyond the control of the elected representatives, and
the humiliating withdrawal from Kargil culminated in a coup
13 0
orchestrated by General Pervez Musharraf.
Suspected to be the architect of the military actions in Kargil,
Musharraf had no credibility as a peace partner. After the exiling of
the two former prime ministers Bhutto and Sharif, and the cementing
of Musharrafs grip on power, India invited him for a summit in
Agra. 131 Mr. Musharraf kindled hopes of building on the Lahore
Declaration, but instead the summit ended in recriminations and
rancor. 132 The Indian side felt that they had been used by a canny
Mr. Musharraf to bolster his credibility in Pakistan and to
grandstand on the global stage. 133 There are no drafts of the
agreement or records that would explain what caused the failure to
13 4
arrive at an agreement, and it is hard to pin blame precisely.

126.
Id.
127.
See generally Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1.
128.
See GlobalSecurity.org, 1999 Kargil Conflict, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/worldlwar/kargil-99.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
129.
BRUCE RIEDEL, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE 1999 KARGIL SUMMIT AT
BLAIR HOUSE 4 (2002).
130.
Gaurav Kampani, The Military Coup in Pakistan:Implications for Nuclear
Stability in South Asia, CNS REP., Oct. 1999, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reportsl
gaurav.htm.
131.
Agra Summit at a Glance, BBC NEWS, July 17, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/south asia1430367.stm.
132.
Id.
133.
Sultan Shahin, Something to DeclareAfter All, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Jul. 18,
2001, http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/CG18Df02.html (discussing India's distrust of
Musharraf after the coup).
134.
See Agra Summit at a Glance, supra note 131.
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According to some, "Pakistan's insistence on the settlement of the
Jammu [and] Kashmir issue, as a pre-condition for the normalization
135
of relations," was the breaking point.
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the World
Trade Center, Kashmiri separatists attacked the state legislature in
13 6
Srinagar (located in Indian Kashmir), killing thirty-eight people.
Perhaps emboldened by this attack, militants associated with
Lashkar-e-Taiba assaulted the Indian parliament in New Delhi and
killed fourteen people on December 13, 2 0 0 1 .137 Almost reflexively,
India alleged that Pakistan was responsible for both attacks, and
there was talk in India of bombing terrorist camps in Pakistan.
Alarmed at the prospect of war and its impact on its operations in
Afghanistan, the United States induced both sides to return to the
negotiating table. 138 India agreed to stop its military deployment
along the border, and Pakistan pledged to destroy terrorist camps
inside its border. These agreements have not been reduced to writing,
and there does not appear to be any guarantee of compliance or a
monitoring agency to evaluate the situation.
The War on Terror and the attendant military operations by the
United States in Afghanistan focused more attention on the region.
The danger that a fundamentalist Pakistan presented also served to
convince the United States of the need for greater involvement in
South Asia. Satisfied that its position with regard to Pakistaninspired militancy in Kashmir was finally being appreciated by the
United States and encouraged by the growing economic relationship

135.
A.G. Noorani, The Truth About Agra, FRONTLINE, Jul. 16-29, 2005,
available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2215/stories/20050729002104400.htm.
According to an author on the Pakistani side, "Pakistani officials maintain that the
Indians backtracked thrice on an agreed draft following pressure from some of their
cabinet ministers opposed to the peace process.
The Indians objected to the
formulation of the proposed declaration which reportedly said that, 'The settlement of
the Kashmir issue would pave the way for normalisation of relations between the two
countries."' Zahid Hussain, A Bridge Too Far, NEWSLINE, Aug. 2001, http://www.
newsline.com.pk/NewsAug2001/coverstoryl.htm. The Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee
said, "During the talks, he [General Musharraf] took a stand that the violence that was
taking place in Jammu and Kashmir could not be described as 'terrorism.' He
continued to claim that the bloodshed in the State was nothing but the people's battle
for freedom." Musharraf to Blame for Summit Failure, HINDU, Sept. 27, 2006,
available
at
http://www.hindu.com/2006/O9/27/stories/2006092711440100.htm.
According to Vajpayee, it was this stand that resulted in the failure of the Agra
Summit. Id.
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137.
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138.
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englishlarchive/2001-12/a-2001-12-25-26-New.cfm?textmode=O.

710

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40:687

between India and Pakistan, India became more responsive to U.S.
entreaties to mend relations. In May 2003, Pakistani Parliament
members visited New Delhi, and in July of the same year, members of
the Indian Parliament visited Islamabad. 139 A few months later, a
ceasefire was reestablished in Kashmir. 140 In January 2004, Prime
Minister Vajpayee met President Musharraf while attending the
meeting of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation in
Islamabad. 141 This meeting heralded a new round of negotiations,
called the Composite Dialogue. 142 However, there has not been much
progress beyond this meeting, and a comprehensive peace agreement
is still elusive.

IV.

EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS

This Part will analyze the success (or the lack thereof) of the
agreements that were discussed in Part III. The principal tool of
analysis is the elegant analytical lens of legalization. The two broad
peace agreements, Shimla and Lahore, are written in general
The other
language without any specific actionable items.
agreements-chiefly the Indus Waters Treaty, the Rann of Kutch
Agreement, the Nuclear Prohibition on Attack Agreement, and the
Chemical Weapons Agreement-are all drafted with specific
undertakings by both governments. Not surprisingly, it is these more
specific agreements that have been the most successful. An analysis
of the peace agreements does not reveal any discernible larger,
longer-term strategy either; the agreements appear to be ad hoc and
lack long-term vision. Unlike the Oslo Accords, which are said to be
the product of the four-fold methodological strategies of "open-ended
gradualism,"
"constructive
ambiguity,"
"bilateralism,"
and
"reciprocity," the only two methodological approaches that apply to
the peace accords
between India and Pakistan are "bilateralism" and
"reciprocity." 143 Gradualism is clearly not visible, as there does not
appear to be any overarching policy of incremental agreement
building. 144 The progress made in each agreement has not been
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141.
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142.
Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue 2004-05: A Profile, IPCS Special Report 12,
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carried over to the subsequent one. It is also clear that bilateralism
has been a key determinant in the agreements because India has
steadfastly refused outside intervention and has consistently
negotiated directly with Pakistan without any intermediaries. 145
Reciprocity is also a key feature, serving as the driving force for
concessions by both sides. 146 It requires that each side emphasize its
own performance upon satisfactory performance by the other. 14 7 This
has, not surprisingly, contributed to tit-for-tat conduct. The following
paragraphs will identify some of the key variables that have
contributed to the limited success of many of the agreements
concluded and will outline some factors that can facilitate better
outcomes.
A. Narrowing the Trust Deficit
"There has been trust deficit in our relations with Pakistan. But
we cannot stand still," said Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at a
recent press conference. 148 This seems to be the classic "prisoner's
dilemma" scenario: a lack of information about the intentions of the
other country exists for each side and prevents cooperation. The
distrust is compounded by the lack of precision in the commitments
that the parties have made and continue to make, which results in
each party's awareness that those commitments can be manipulated
based on preferences that may change over time depending on the
political actor who is in power. Legalization may affect this problem
positively insofar as it provides relevant information to both parties
and facilitates cooperative behavior. Moreover, legalization plays a
salutary role by enhancing the precision of the commitments, thus
limiting opportunistic auto-interpretations and increasing the cost of
such opportunistic conduct. Legalization's other key feature,
delegation, results in third-party monitoring and enforcement,
increasing the incentives for cooperation and the costs of
opportunism. It limits state behavior to a narrowly circumscribed
range of conduct that is ordered along rules and processes that make,
implement, and enforce those rules. Legalization also brings into play

145.
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the legal system and process, limiting the range of plausible
arguments that states can make to evade commitments.
B. Centralization
While a strong case can be made for legalization in the IndiaPakistan context based purely on its dimensions of obligation,
precision, and delegation, the political rubric within which
legalization operates here provides further support. Legalization's
effect on compliance seems to be related to another variable-the
degree of centralization in decisionmaking. While a superficial
analysis might lead one to conclude that hard legalization is the
reason for greater compliance, a more careful analysis would focus on
disaggregating other variables that may contribute to enhanced
compliance. Otherwise, the fact that compliance has been enhanced
after legalization may be due to the subject area of legalization and
the degree to which decisionmaking in that area is concentrated or
centralized. Intuitively, legalization ought to enhance cooperative
behavior for higher degrees of centralized decision-making. This
point is elegantly made by Lutz and Sikkink in the context of human
rights practices in Latin America. 149 They suggest that "international
norms and the pressures exercised to enforce them will be more
effective in securing compliance when decisions are made by a
handful of powerful, central political
actors than when
decisionmaking is decentralized." 150 Centralized decisionmaking
seems to be the motivating force in Latin America, and conditions are
quite similar in Pakistan, which has been subject to military coups
similar to those in many Latin American countries. 151 In the context
of Indo-Pakistan relations, if the oft-repeated Pakistani claim that
terrorism is being fomented by Kashmiri freedom fighters over whom
Pakistan has no control is true, an agreement that is an example of
hard legalization is unlikely to be of much use. No agreement,
regardless of its degree of legalization, signed by the centralized
Pakistani leadership can ensure that terrorism on the Indian side
stops. In contrast, if the Pakistani establishment has a high degree of
control over these "freedom fighters" through its financial, military,
or political support of them, an agreement that exemplifies hard
legalization will enhance compliance because the tap can be turned
off by the President of Pakistan, the Pakistani army, or another

149.
See Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, InternationalHuman Rights Law and
Practice in Latin America, 54 INT'L ORG. 633, 639 (2000) (writing that "if torture
decisions are decentralized, even where state policy categorically outlaws the practice,
police and security officers at local or regional levels may continue to use it to extract
confessions in criminal cases, intimidate local political actors, or to strike fear..
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
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central actor. The high level of centralized decisionmaking authority
should lead India to desire hard legalization, but that has not been
the case so far.
The centralization of power may operate conversely, too. Under
the Moravcsik model, state preferences are shaped by competing
domestic actors that are constantly vying for political space. If a
societal actor, that had been marginalized at the time the then
centralized authority entered into a certain agreement, is successful
in attaining power, erstwhile agreements, regardless of whether they
are exemplars of hard legalization or not, have very little chance of
survival.
This might help explain, partly, India's reluctance to
pursue hard legalization with Pakistan.
C. Norms Cascade-Terrorism
The process of disaggregating reasons to account for enhanced
compliance in cases where there is hard legalization may reveal
another factor-coincidence of a norms cascade. Legalization may be
serving to buttress a norm that has affected behavior and caused
compliance. For example, functionalists would argue that the norm
against the use of chemical weapons was strengthened by its
embodiment in the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997. This
strengthening also serves to prevent retrogression. 152 Lutz and
Sikkink suggest that legalization interacted with political processes
in mutually strengthening ways and "underscored the increasing
strength of the norm consensus. '153 In the context of Latin America,
the norm strengthening seems to have limited the range of acceptable
political conduct, for example, by removing military coups as an
154
acceptable option.
The legalization of peace agreements between India and
Pakistan may have a role to play in strengthening a norms cascade
pertaining to state suppression of terrorism, which occurred after
9/11. According to Sunstein, "Norm cascades occur when societies are
presented with rapid shifts toward new norms. '155 Lutz and Sikkink
suggest that "norms cascades are collections of norm-affirming
events. These events are discursive events-that is, they are verbal or
written statements asserting the norm. ' 156 These events appear to
happen "[a]fter norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of

152.
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states to become norm leaders and adopt new norms. ' 157 At that
point, "the norm reaches a threshold or tipping point. '158 States are
moving toward a point where justification of terrorism on any
grounds is problematic. 159 There is increasingly very little room for
international actors to justify acts of terrorism. 160 This is a change
from the situation that existed before 9/11, when arguments that
seemed to provide moral legitimacy to terrorists were routinely
peddled, mainly on the plea that they were exercising their right to
self-determination. 16 1 In the post-9/11 world, there appears to be a
norms cascade against such pleas, and there is certainly a critical
62
mass of states that denounce terror regardless of the justification.1
This list includes states as far apart on the political spectrum as the
United States and Saudi Arabia. 163 Such a norms cascade against
support for terrorism would aid Pakistan in legalizing an agreement
because the Pakistan leadership could tell its anti-India constituency
that they are sailing against the wind and that support for terrorists
cannot be a viable basis for foreign policy. Here the norm provides an
exogenous basis for structuring the agreement in a legal form and
will allow Pakistan to take steps to crack down on terrorists without
losing face. It will take away the main sticking point for IndiaPakistan's unstinting support for cross-border terrorists-and will
help to create a climate for a legalized solution that reinforces this
norm.
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D. Regime Change and Rule of Law Societies
The relationship between the kind of regime that a state
possesses and compliance with international obligations is a
problematic one. Simmons disaggregates democracy as a variable
and finds that although domestic actors, who are more favorably
inclined to legalization, may be more influential in democracies, there
is a negative correlation between democracy and compliance. 164 She
states that rules and popular pressures can pull in opposite directions
in international law compliance. 1 65 She provides the evidence of
territorial disputes in Latin America, which did not indicate a
"democratic effect" with regard to compliance. 166 She does, however,
find a strong and significant relationship between compliance and
societies that are founded on the rule of law. 167 One of the key goals of
the India-Pakistan peace agreements is to reduce the number of
incidences of terrorism. 168 The fact that Pakistan is a state that has
been frequently accused of fomenting and supporting terrorism is not
unrelated to its status as a closed and undemocratic society. One
author writes that "in the modern international system, democracies
have almost never fought each other."'1 69 As seen in the example of
Hamas, many Islamists think democracy is heresy and that one
should only be ruled by God's laws (this thinking can be seen in
Pakistan as well). 170 Since this Islamic doctrine is valued more than
the democratic process, it is hard to say if democracy will be a
negative force-by allowing radical fundamentalist political elements
to enter the mainstream-or a positive one.171 Regardless of these
risks, historical experience suggests that ushering in democracy in
Pakistan can only help the process of peace. If India believes that
there is a positive correlation between a democratic regime in
Pakistan and compliance with peace agreements, then it might
choose not to negotiate with President Musharraf and thus signal to
the people of Pakistan that they need to oust their dictator if they are
interested in peace. Such a course would embolden societal actors
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who are opposed to the current regime to mobilize international
opinion against Musharraf. If he is seen to be an obstacle to peace,
there could be a realignment of societal actors to have their
preferences for peace replace the existing state preference.
E. Domestic Politics and Legalization
Domestic politics plays a role in shaping state preferences,
particularly because of the disproportionate impact of particular
interest groups. The legal constituency is one such actor and has a
strong interest in legal structures in agreement design because it
represents an opportunity to expand influence by participating in
advising, drafting, and interpreting these instruments.
In the
commercial context, legal agreement structures might help to
generate new revenue streams for lawyers. 172 Some models focus on
domestic politicians as the relevant actors. 173 Under these theories,
politicians approach the task of structuring and concluding
international agreements as a means to appeal to voters or, in the
case of nondemocratic societies, to selected constituencies such as the
174
police and the army.
In the India-Pakistan context, the extent of friction is consistent
with liberal theory, which states that "where an attempt by
dominant social groups in one country to realize their preferences
through state action necessarily imposes costs (negative externalities)
on dominant social groups in other countries, governments face a
bargaining game with few mutual gains and a high potential for
interstate tension and conflict. ' 175 The increase in transparency that
legalized agreements offer could present a way to minimize the
dominant role played by certain elites. In the case of Pakistan, the
dominant social groups trying to realize their preferences through
state action at the expense of groups in India are the army and the
religious parties. The employment of non-legal agreements ensures
that these elites have a monopoly on the debate and that other
players in the political spectrum are shut out. Given that the
Pakistan Army has ruled the country for a significant part of that
country's history, other civil society actors have been completely shut
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out of the process of structuring agreements with India. There has
been no freely elected Parliament for significant periods to debate the
form and substance of the agreements. This has robbed the process of
accountability and has ensured that there has not been an
opportunity for other actors to participate in the competition to
realize their preferences through state action. It might be
advantageous to foster the participation of actors who have no vested
interest in war (unlike the army). Legal agreements are
advantageous over non-legal agreements in this regard, because they
trigger a constitutional process with deliberative fora and
interpretative tribunals that have to be involved at different stages.
Political agreements, on the other hand, are negotiated in secret upon
the pretext that they have national security implications, are
frequently opaque on content, and are not justiciable once concluded.
Thus, there is a link between international legalization and domestic
politics that has favorable implications for the peace process.
When conducted in the full public glare of the democratic
political process, the sovereignty cost imposed by the agreement
translates into a loss of support for the political leader from
constituencies that are opposed to the agreement. The other aspect of
domestic politics pertains to the leaders' desire to join high status
clubs of civilized states that are signatories to legal agreements. 176
This is a salient point for leaders who have obtained power through
illegitimate means. Achieving membership in high status clubs by
committing their states to international agreements bolsters their
fragile image and gives them a small modicum of legitimacy. In this
scenario, international law either has exogenous power as a
legitimizing influence or coincides with some other normative power
that achieves this result. The status-conferring potential of
international law agreements has not been fully understood, and it is
not the domain of this Article to embark on a full exegesis of the
relationship between illegitimate leaders and their attitudes toward
international law. It must be noted, however, that actions like that of
the Commonwealth in suspending Pakistan from its membership
because of the military coup, have the potential to strip its leadership
of esteem and thereby convince it to follow certain asserted norms.
The employment of legalized forms in agreement design may also
be a tool in the context of domestic politics used by one domestic
institution to constrain the powers of other institutions. This is
particularly true when foreign policy is contentious domestically and
there is competition amongst various groups seeking to express their
preferences through state action. In such situations, every foreign
policy decision tends to become a hotly contested decision that is
liable to be questioned and even overturned by other rival institutions
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that may not see eye-to-eye with the executive branch or the
particular political leader involved. By committing the state to a
legalized agreement, the political leader or the executive branch may
be aiming to limit the ability of rival institutions to challenge their
actions. The demand for legalization in these scenarios may also come
from the other parties to the agreement; these parties might believe
that a non-legalized agreement to which the political leader or
executive adheres will not be worth much due to the domestic
dissonance in the state. For this reason, they might insist on
legalization to ensure that the agreement does not become a victim of
domestic politics. Legalization protects the other parties by binding
rival institutions and successor governments (with the caveat that
the agreement can be denounced by successor governments in some
circumstances). 177 This interaction of liberal theory with legalization
presents interesting insights for India-Pakistan relations.
F. Compliance Constituencies
The employment of legalized forms has the ability to mobilize
compliance constituencies that can improve the compliance levels of
international agreements. 178 It empowers these constituencies and
enhances their ability to influence governments by holding
governments accountable to obligations that were entered into by the
state. Legalization has a powerful signaling function because it comes
with ex ante informational and negotiating costs, and the costs and
benefits are articulated so that winners and losers are better
identified than they would be through non-legal agreements, which
are to a large extent shrouded in secrecy. 17 9 By their very nature,
legal
agreements
might require approvals
from different
governmental agencies, and this approval entails a high level of
disclosure and debate. Parties that are most likely to gain from the
agreement will have an incentive to legalize it and thus make certain
their gains. It will also bolster actors who have a vested interest in
holding the state to its bargain to utilize domestic institutional
processes to prevent opposing actors from revisionistic preference
alteration. 180
It must be remembered that triggering the operation of the legal
process also has a greater potential to mobilize those opposed to the
international agreement. Goldstein and Martin argue that in the
context of trade agreements, "a number of factors suggest that
increased information
is
likely to
favor proprotectionist
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mobilization."''18 They mention "experimental evidence that actors
tend to react more strongly to losses than to gains, again favoring
protectionist groups in this mobilization dynamic." 182 The IndiaPakistan context seems to suggest the opposite. The only mobilized
actors in the current non-legalized scenario appear to be the ones
against peace-the hawks on both sides. On the Pakistani side, this
group includes the army, the intelligence agency (called the
Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI), the various Islamic
parties, and the terrorist organizations.18 3 On the Indian side, it is
84
comprised mainly of some radical elements in the Hindu far right.
It appears unlikely that the anti-peace groups could get any more
mobilized than they are at present. The pro-peace groups, on the
other hand, are divided and are not yet mobilized into a core
constituency that can articulate views in a coherent manner.
Legalization may serve to mobilize this constituency, and the
potential for gains due to informational advantages may serve a
powerful signaling function. Specifically, it has the potential to allow
business groups to see the possibility for greater economic interaction
with resultant profits, thus incentivizing them to become bigger
champions for a lasting peace than they currently are. Economic
operators value certainty to a greater degree than political actors;
therefore, legalization should have particular appeal for them. 185
They are also more accustomed to contract-based dealings, and
legalization gives them a vehicle that is familiar and easy to
186
enforce.
In order to create a coherent compliance constituency that
transcends the border, the trust barrier must be crossed. The lack of
trust between the two sides is a major cause of the failure of the
peace agreements attempted so far and also of the muted reactions
from pro-peace constituencies.1 8 7 Both sides are suspicious of the
other and believe that each is determined to extract advantages
without giving anything in return.' 8 8 Thus, the peace negotiation
process has turned into a war strategy, with the result that there are
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no winners. A key to the distrust that persists between the two
countries is the perceived absence of good faith. 189 Consider, for
example, a simple act such as India's decision to construct a fence
inside its border to prevent incursions in Kashmir. Pakistan objected
to this act as a violation of earlier agreements. 190 The agreement
that the Pakistani side is referring to is purportedly the Shimla
Agreement. 191 Upon a perusal of the Agreement and the sections
extracted in this Article, it is hard to see if there is, in fact, a
violation. The Shimla Agreement makes clear that the border dispute
is unsettled, and in that sense, the Pakistanis might contend that the
fencing makes the Line of Control the permanent border. 192 The
Pakistanis have also sought to equate the fencing with that done by
the Israelis. 193 This analogy has been rejected by the United States
Department of State on the ground that the Indian fencing is entirely
within its own territory. 194 Thus, it would appear that the Pakistani
argument is without much merit, as the Line of Control is the de facto
border anyway, and the Indian action is not changing anything. This
sort of argument would have been harder to make if the Agreement
had been an example of hard legalization, with its attendant
attributes of obligation, precision, and delegation.
A study of the India-Pakistan peace agreement process reveals a
significant lack of activity by non-state compliance constituencies,
suggesting that there is a vacuum that can be usefully filled.
Informal exchanges between the people can create such compliance
constituencies and build confidence enormously. Such exchanges are
a recent phenomenon and are a welcome change from the hostility
that existed in the past. One example of this is the Eleventh World
Punjab Conference in Patiala (Indian Punjab) held in 2004, which
featured Chaudhary Pervez Elahi, Chief Minister of Pakistan's
Punjab Province, as chief guest. 195 There was even a Punjab
Games. 196 Not surprisingly, Punjabi leaders demanded rapid
normalization of Indo-Pak relations, more trade, tourism, and a bus
service between Patiala and Lahore. 197 Punjab was a large state in
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pre-independent India and is now divided between India and
Pakistan, and Punjabis are a distinct and powerful group in the
cultural lives of both countries, playing a dominant role in the one
thing that unites both countries-Bollywood. 198 It is the breadbasket
of both countries and has affluent populations that stand to gain from
increased commercial interactions. 199 Indian-Punjab has endured
enormous losses due to terrorist activity in the early 1980s, allegedly
at the incitement of Pakistan, and the enlisting of Punjabis on both
sides of the border can have a highly symbolic effect on the peace
process. This compliance constituency can serve as a model for the
analogously situated Kashmir. It might also facilitate a more active
role for the largest, but dormant, constituency-India's Muslims. The
informational advantages offered by legalized agreements can help
India's large Muslim population to play a major role by electing
politicians who are more favorable to peaceful relations with
Pakistan. With legalization comes voting records in Parliament, and
the airing of opinions in the public sphere. The pan-Islamic solidarity
might also motivate more moderate Muslims in Pakistan to pressure
actors there to adopt less hawkish positions upon the idea that the
negative externalities that their actions impose on India will have to
be borne by their Muslim brethren as well. India's Muslim population
has been largely marginalized in the peace process, mainly because of
suspicion by the Hindus about their true loyalties, and this must
change.
Common sporting interests also offer the opportunity to create
viable compliance pressures. Cricket, the dominant sport in both
countries, is a passion that unites the masses and prompted India
and Pakistan to resume mutual cricket tours after more than twenty
years of obdurate refusal to play in each others countries (despite
playing in neutral venues). 20 0 The visit of the Indian cricket team for
the so-called "friendship series" in 2004 saw ordinary Pakistanis
expressing a level of hospitality and friendship towards visiting
20 1
Indian fans that was stunning even by sub-continental standards.
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Recent years have seen a spurt of high-visibility persons from both
sides exchanging visits, and the liberalization of visa regulations is
expected to increase such interactions even further. 20 2 With greater
interaction has come a better appreciation for the common culture,
must acutely exemplified by the popularity of Indian movies in
Pakistan. 20 3 It has helped that General Musharraf and his wife are
huge Bollywood fans! This interest has not gone unnoticed by
filmmakers keen on cashing in on the revenue potential of an
Films that have cross border appeal with
enlarged market.
characters from both countries are obvious candidates. One example
in this genre is the Hindi movie Veer-Zaara, a love story between an
Indian Hindu rescue pilot and a Pakistani Muslim girl who travels to
India, followed shortly thereafter by the besotted pilot's trip to
Pakistan to seek her hand in marriage. 20 4 The Indian pilot is played
by the leading Bollywood actor who happens to be Muslim, while the
Muslim woman is portrayed by a Hindu actress. 20 5 The shift in tone
towards Pakistan is a dramatic change from the Bollywood films that
were made in the immediate aftermath of the Kargil incident, which
were more in the nature of propaganda films for the Indian army.
That Indian films are so popular in Pakistan-despite the fact that
such films have been banned in Pakistan since 1965-is a living
testament to the power of culture to unite people. Several Pakistani
actresses have moved to Bombay to seek work, and this is likely 20to6
have a salutary effect on the popularity of Indian films in Pakistan.
The general shift in attitudes at a layperson level has been met
by burgeoning of several citizen initiatives that are tailored to foster
interaction across the border. Such initiatives include friendship
societies, lectures, and concerts, with participants across the political
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spectrum. 20 7 Highly visible and symbolic events, such as the lighting
independence days, have also
of candles at the Wagah border 2on
08
served to create a climate of peace.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The liberal international law theories have important
implications for India-Pakistan relations when studied alongside
insights from legalization theory. The opportunity that the legal
process provides for non-state actors to participate in the shaping of
state preferences, and the employment of institutions other than the
executive, seems to be a key feature in agreements that have been
successful. These features are notably absent in some agreements
between India and Pakistan, such as the Lahore and Shimla accords,
both of which are regarded as failures. 20 9 It bears noting that the
agreements that have been successful (Rann of Kutch, Indus Water,
and Chemical Weapons) all exhibit hard legalization under the
Abbott-Snidal framework. 210 There is definitely a lesson to be learned
here; the correlation suggests cautious optimism for legalized
agreements that exhibit high levels of obligation, precision, and
delegation. The evidence of conduct between India and Pakistan also
shows that what Abbott and Snidal would characterize as soft
legalization is not regarded either as law or as a constraining
influence by either state. 211 Military action has not been prevented by
the Shimla and Lahore agreements, and both sides disregard them
with impunity when it suits them. This is in distinct contrast to those
agreements that are characterized by hard legalization and are
observed as legal and binding despite the onset of military conflict.
The conclusion seems powerful that India and Pakistan do not place
much value on non-legal agreements in terms of compliance and do
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not believe that they are bound by obligations contained in such
agreements.
Thr functionalist argument that soft law is advantageous
because of lower contracting costs-meaning the expenditure in
terms of drafting time, negotiation, and ratification-may have to be
modified in the context of states like Pakistan. Abbott and Snidal
argue that hard legalization is more costly because states are more
careful in "negotiating and drafting legal agreements, since the costs
of violation are higher." 212 In fact, costs are incurred in the case of
non-legal agreements as well; experts will still be consulted,
differences between competing interests must still be resolved, and
negotiation is still just as contentious since proponents of various
interests argue just as vigorously (as exemplified so powerfully in the
Agra summit previously discussed). 213 In the Pakistani context, the
added contracting costs (if any) imposed by legalization may be offset
by the fact that the only parties who will be added to the negotiation
process are those who are most likely to support peaceful relations
and who have been excluded by the secret nature of political
agreement negotiation. Those opposed to peaceful relations are
already part of the process and the externalities imposed by them
must be borne in any event. Raustiala's argument that the risk of
opportunistic conduct may be the causal variable that "suggests that
pledges will be observed only when the risk of opportunism is low and
uncertainty is high,"214 has great salience here. In the case of India
and Pakistan, the trust deficit creates conducive conditions for
opportunistic conduct and suggests that hard legalization may be
preferable.
Hard legalization is also supported by liberal theory, which
suggests that credibility is factored into the choice of soft law versus
hard law. 215 When credibility is dependent on legislative approval,
states are more likely to prefer hard law, unless there are other
institutional mechanisms to ensure and enhance credibility. 216
Raustiala writes that in "more technocratic and arcane areas, the
available empirical evidence suggests that the prevalence of pledges
roughly, if inconsistently, rises as uncertainty rises-as functional
theory predicts." 217 He provides examples to support both the
functionalist claim that uncertainty influences the form of
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international agreement and the liberal claim that pledges are "most
common in areas of low domestic salience. '218 Given that Pakistan is
not a democratic society and is subject to capricious regime changes,
it would be in India's interest to enhance the credibility of Pakistan's
commitments by insisting on hard legalization. Such insistence
would give India the opportunity to read signals conveyed by the key
constituencies as a result of the debate over the high levels of
obligation, precision, and delegation, and to hone its own negotiating
strategy after gauging the seriousness of the other side. It would also
prevent successor
governments
from unraveling
soft law
commitments on the plea that they are not binding. Domestic politics
would identify the key actors ranged on either side of the debate and
the various tradeoffs that can facilitate agreements are more visible.
Insisting on hard legalization will also focus attention on
obligation-a dimension of legalization upon which the Abbott-Snidal
thesis does not elaborate. 219 Their theory would not suggest an
answer to the question of whether obligations can be legitimately
220
entered into by a military dictator who seizes power in a coup. If
the answer is in the negative, hard legalization will not help India
very much as long as President Musharraf leads Pakistan. It may be
possible to mitigate the democratic deficit by other processes that
legalization triggers-for example, parliamentary deliberation and
debate-to the extent that Pakistan's current constitutional structure
allows it. In any event, hard legalization is preferable even under this
view because it has informational advantages over non-legalization or
soft legalization: in the latter instances, there is no room for
participation by parties other than the nominees of the illegitimate
power holder, and there is no way in which the other side can gauge
the reaction of the legitimate players to the proposed agreement.
There must also be a greater appreciation of the role of
international law norms in the process. There is some evidence that
legalization interacts with a norm cascade that may be in process in a
mutually reinforcing manner. Specifically, the certain norm cascade
against state support or justification of terrorist activity has the
potential to facilitate legalization in the India-Pakistan context.
Legalization can therefore ensure that there is no regression of this
norm, and it can play a salutary role in strengthening other norms
such as rule of law, transparency, and democracy, none of which are
well established in Pakistan. It can also facilitate the role of norm
entrepreneurs by enlisting their participation in the agreement
process.
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Finally, in contrast to other areas that have been subject to
empirical examination with the legalization lens, there is room for
cautious optimism about the positive correlation between hard
legalization and compliance when the actors are high conflict states.
This Article invites an empirical examination of other high conflict
states, such as Israel and Palestine, using the legalization framework
to determine if the positive correlation is pervasive.

